

Supplement to “Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring”

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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2

We prove that $\overline{E_{\text{talk}}(\delta, p)} = \overline{E_{\text{med}}(\delta)}$. In our construction, players ignore private signals $y_{i,t}$ observed in periods $t = 1, 2, \dots$. That is, only signal $y_{i,0}$ observed in period 0 is used. Hence we can see p as an ex ante correlation device. Since we consider two-player games, whenever we say players i and j , we assume that they are different players: $i \neq j$.

The structure of the proof is as follows: take any strategy of the mediator, $\tilde{\mu}$, that satisfies inequality (3) in the text (perfect monitoring incentive compatibility), and let $\tilde{v}$ be the value when the players follow $\tilde{\mu}$. Since each $\hat{v} \in E_{\text{med}}(\delta)$ has a corresponding $\hat{\mu}$ that satisfies perfect monitoring incentive compatibility, it suffices to show that, for each $\varepsilon > 0$, there exists a sequential equilibrium whose equilibrium payoff v satisfies $\|v - \tilde{v}\| < \varepsilon$ in the following environment:

- (i) At the beginning of the game, each player i receives a message m_i^{mediator} from the mediator.
- (ii) In each period t , the stage game proceeds as follows:
 - (a) Given player i 's history $(m_i^{\text{mediator}}, (m_\tau^{1\text{st}}, a_\tau, m_\tau^{2\text{nd}})_{\tau=1}^{t-1})$, each player i sends the first message $m_{i,t}^{1\text{st}}$ simultaneously.
 - (b) Given player i 's history $(m_i^{\text{mediator}}, (m_\tau^{1\text{st}}, a_\tau, m_\tau^{2\text{nd}})_{\tau=1}^{t-1}, m_t^{1\text{st}})$, each player i takes action $a_{i,t}$ simultaneously.
 - (c) Given player i 's history $(m_i^{\text{mediator}}, (m_\tau^{1\text{st}}, a_\tau, m_\tau^{2\text{nd}})_{\tau=1}^{t-1}, m_t^{1\text{st}}, a_t)$, each player i sends the second message $m_{i,t}^{2\text{nd}}$ simultaneously.

We call this environment *perfect monitoring with cheap talk*.

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To this end, from $\tilde{\mu}$, we first create a strict full-support equilibrium μ with mediated perfect monitoring that yields payoffs close to $\tilde{v}$. We then move from μ to a similar equilibrium μ^* , which will be easier to transform into an equilibrium with perfect monitoring with cheap talk. Finally, from μ^* , we create an equilibrium with perfect monitoring with cheap talk with the same on-path action distribution.

Construction and properties of μ

In this subsection, we consider mediated perfect monitoring throughout. Since $\tilde{W}^* \neq \emptyset$, by Lemma 2 in the main text, there exists a strict full-support equilibrium μ^{strict} with mediated perfect monitoring. As in the proof of that lemma, consider the following strategy of the mediator: In period 1, the mediator draws one of two states, $R_{\tilde{v}}$ and R_{perturb} , with probabilities $1 - \eta$ and η , respectively. In state $R_{\tilde{v}}$, the mediator's recommendation is determined as follows: If no player has deviated up to period t , the mediator recommends r_t according to $\tilde{\mu}(h_m^t)$; if only player i has deviated, the mediator recommends $r_{j,t}$ to player j according to α_j^* , and recommends some best response to α_j^* to player i . Multiple deviations are treated as in the proof of Lemma 1. In contrast, in state R_{perturb} , the mediator follows the equilibrium μ^{strict} . Let μ denote this strategy of the mediator. From now on, we fix $\eta > 0$ arbitrarily.

With mediated perfect monitoring, since μ^{strict} has full support, player i believes that the mediator's state is R_{perturb} with positive probability after any history. Therefore, by perfect monitoring incentive compatibility and the fact that μ^{strict} is a strict equilibrium, it is always strictly optimal for each player i to follow her recommendation. This means that, for each period t , there exist $\varepsilon_t > 0$ and $T_t < \infty$ such that, for each player i and on-path history h_m^{t+1} , we have

$$\begin{aligned} & (1 - \delta)\mathbb{E}^\mu[u_i(r_t) \mid h_m^t, r_{i,t}] + \delta\mathbb{E}^\mu\left[(1 - \delta) \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \delta^{\tau-t-1} u_i(\mu(h_m^\tau)) \mid h_m^t, r_{i,t}\right] \\ & > \max_{a_i \in A_i} (1 - \delta)\mathbb{E}[u_i(a_i, r_{j,t}) \mid h_m^t, r_{i,t}] \\ & \quad + (\delta - \delta^{T_t}) \left\{ (1 - \varepsilon_t) \max_{\hat{a}_i} u_i(\hat{a}_i, \alpha_j^{\varepsilon_t}) + \varepsilon_t \max_{a \in A} u_i(a) \right\} + \delta^{T_t} \max_{a \in A} u_i(a). \end{aligned} \tag{S1}$$

That is, suppose that if player i unilaterally deviates from on-path history, then player j virtually minmaxes player i for $T_t - 1$ periods with probability $1 - \varepsilon_t$. (Recall that α_j^* is the minmax strategy and α_j^ε is a full-support perturbation of α_j^* .) Then player i has a strict incentive not to deviate from any recommendation in period t on equilibrium path. Equivalently, since μ is a full-support recommendation, player i has a strict incentive not to deviate unless she herself has deviated.

Moreover, for sufficiently small $\varepsilon_t > 0$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & (1 - \delta)\mathbb{E}^\mu[u_i(r_t) \mid h_m^t, r_{i,t}] + \delta\mathbb{E}^\mu\left[(1 - \delta) \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \delta^{\tau-t-1} u_i(\mu(h_m^\tau)) \mid h_m^t\right] \\ & > (1 - \delta^{T_t}) \left\{ (1 - \varepsilon_t) \max_{\hat{a}_i} u_i(\hat{a}_i, \alpha_j^{\varepsilon_t}) + \varepsilon_t \max_{a \in A} u_i(a) \right\} + \delta^{T_t} \max_{a \in A} u_i(a). \end{aligned} \tag{S2}$$

That is, if a deviation is punished with probability $1 - \varepsilon_t$ for T_t periods including the current period, then player i believes that the deviation is strictly unprofitable.¹

For each t , we fix $\varepsilon_t > 0$ and $T_t < \infty$ with (S1) and (S2). Without loss, we can take ε_t decreasing: $\varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon_{t+1}$ for each t .

Construction and properties of μ^*

In this subsection, we again consider mediated perfect monitoring. We further modify μ and create the following mediator's strategy μ^* : Fix a fully mixed $\hat{\mu} \in \Delta(A)$ with $u(\hat{\mu}) \in \mathring{W}^*$. At the beginning of the game, for each i , t , and a^t , the mediator draws $r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t)$ according to $\alpha_i^{\varepsilon_t}$. In addition, for each i and t , she draws $\omega_{i,t} \in \{R, P\}$ such that $\omega_{i,t} = R$ (regular) and P (punish) with probability $1 - p_t$ and p_t , respectively, independently across i and t . We will pin down $p_t > 0$ in Lemma S1. Moreover, given $\omega_t = (\omega_{1,t}, \omega_{2,t})$, the mediator chooses $r_t(a^t)$ for each a^t as follows: If $\omega_{1,t} = \omega_{2,t} = R$, then she draws $r_t(a^t)$ according to $\mu(a^t)(r)$ if $\omega_{1,\tau} = \omega_{2,\tau} = R$ for each $\tau \leq t-1$; and draws $r_t(a^t)$ according to $\hat{\mu}(r)$ if there exists $\tau \leq t-1$ with $\omega_{1,\tau} = P$ or $\omega_{2,\tau} = P$. If $\omega_{i,t} = R$ and $\omega_{j,t} = P$, then she draws $r_{i,t}(a^t)$ from $\Pr^\mu(r_i | r_{j,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t))$ while she draws $r_{j,t}(a^t)$ randomly from $\sum_{a_j \in A_j} \frac{a_j}{|A_j|}$.² Finally, if $\omega_{1,t} = \omega_{2,t} = P$, then she draws $r_{i,t}(a^t)$ randomly from $\sum_{a_i \in A_i} \frac{a_i}{|A_i|}$ for each i independently. Since μ has full support, μ^* is well defined.

As will be seen, we will take p_t sufficiently small. In addition, recall that $\eta > 0$ (the perturbation of $\hat{\mu}$ to μ) is arbitrarily. In the next subsection and onward, we construct an equilibrium with perfect monitoring with cheap talk that has the same equilibrium action distribution as μ^* . Since p_t is small and $\eta > 0$ is arbitrary, constructing such an equilibrium suffices to prove Proposition 2.

At the start of the game, the mediator draws ω_t , $r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t)$, and $r_t(a^t)$ for each i , t , and a^t . Given them, the mediator sends messages to the players as follows:

- (i) At the start of the game, the mediator sends $((r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t))_{a^t \in A^{t-1}})_{t=1}^\infty$ to player i .
- (ii) In each period t , the stage game proceeds as follows:
 - (a) The mediator decides $\bar{\omega}_t(a^t) \in \{R, P\}^2$ as follows: if there is no unilateral deviator (defined below), then the mediator sets $\bar{\omega}_t(a^t) = \omega_t$. If instead player i is a unilateral deviator, then the mediator sets $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$ and $\bar{\omega}_{j,t}(a^t) = P$.
 - (b) Given $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t)$, the mediator sends $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t)$ to player i . In addition, if $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$, then the mediator sends $r_{i,t}(a^t)$ to player i as well.
 - (c) Given these messages, player i takes an action. In equilibrium, if player i has not yet deviated, then player i takes $r_{i,t}(a^t)$ if $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$ and takes $r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t)$

¹If the current on-path recommendation schedule $\Pr^\mu(r_{j,t} | h_m^t, r_{i,t})$ is very close to α_j^* , then (S2) may be more restrictive than (S1).

²As will be seen below, if $\omega_{j,t} = P$, then player j is supposed to take $r_{j,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t)$. Hence, $r_{j,t}(a^t)$ does not affect the equilibrium action. We define $r_{j,t}(a^t)$ so that, when the mediator sends a message only at the beginning of the game (in the game with perfect monitoring with cheap talk), she sends a “dummy recommendation” $r_{j,t}(a^t)$ so that player j does not realize that $\omega_{j,t} = P$ until period t .

if $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P$. For notational convenience, let

$$r_{i,t} = \begin{cases} r_i(a^t) & \text{if } \bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R, \\ r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t) & \text{if } \bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P \end{cases}$$

be the action that player i is supposed to take if she has not yet deviated. Her strategy after her own deviation is not specified.

We say that player i has unilaterally deviated if there exist $\tau \leq t-1$ and a unique i such that (i) for each $\tau' < \tau$, we have $a_{n,\tau'} = r_{n,\tau'}$ for each $n \in \{1, 2\}$ (no deviation happened until period $\tau-1$) and (ii) $a_{i,\tau} \neq r_{i,\tau}$ and $a_{j,\tau} = r_{j,\tau}$ (player i deviates in period τ and player j does not deviate).

Note that μ^* is close to μ on the equilibrium path for sufficiently small p_t . Hence, on-path strict incentive compatibility for player i follows from (S1). Moreover, the incentive compatibility condition analogous to (S2) also holds.

LEMMA S1. *There exists $\{p_t\}_{t=1}^\infty$ with $p_t > 0$ for each t such that it is strictly optimal for each player i to follow her recommendation: For each player i and history*

$$h_i^t \equiv (((r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t))_{a^t \in A^{t-1}})_{t=1}^\infty, a^t, (\bar{\omega}_\tau(a^\tau))_{\tau=1}^{t-1}, \bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t), (r_{i,\tau})_{\tau=1}^t),$$

if player i herself has not yet deviated, we have the following two inequalities:

- (i) *If a deviation is punished by $\alpha_j^{\varepsilon_t}$ for the next period T_t periods with probability $1 - \varepsilon_t - \sum_{\tau=t}^{t+T_t-1} p_\tau$, then it is strictly unprofitable:*

$$\begin{aligned} & (1 - \delta) \mathbb{E}^{\mu^*} [u_i(r_{i,t}, a_{j,t}) \mid h_i^t] + \delta \mathbb{E}^{\mu^*} \left[(1 - \delta) \sum_{\tau=t+1}^\infty \delta^{\tau-t-1} u_i(r_{i,\tau}, a_{j,\tau}) \mid h_i^t, a_{i,t} = r_{i,t} \right] \\ & > \max_{a_i \in A_i} (1 - \delta) \mathbb{E}^{\mu^*} [u_i(a_i, a_{j,t}) \mid h_i^t] \\ & \quad + (\delta - \delta^{T_t}) \left\{ \left(1 - \varepsilon_t - \sum_{\tau=t}^{t+T_t-1} p_\tau \right) \max_{\hat{a}_i} u_i(\hat{a}_i, \alpha_j^{\varepsilon_t}) \right. \\ & \quad \left. + \left(\varepsilon_t + \sum_{\tau=t}^{t+T_t-1} p_\tau \right) \max_{a \in A} u_i(a) \right\} \\ & \quad + \delta^{T_t} \max_{a \in A} u_i(a). \end{aligned} \tag{S3}$$

- (ii) *If a deviation is punished by $\alpha_j^{\varepsilon_t}$ from the current period with probability $1 - \varepsilon_t - \sum_{\tau=t}^{t+T_t-1} p_\tau$, then it is strictly unprofitable:*

$$\begin{aligned} & (1 - \delta) \mathbb{E}^{\mu^*} [u_i(r_{i,t}, a_{j,t}) \mid h_i^t] \\ & \quad + \delta \mathbb{E}^{\mu^*} \left[(1 - \delta) \sum_{\tau=t+1}^\infty \delta^{\tau-t-1} u_i(r_{i,\tau}, a_{j,\tau}) \mid h_i^t, a_{i,t} = r_{i,t} \right] \end{aligned} \tag{S4}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&> (1 - \delta^{T_t}) \left\{ \left(1 - \varepsilon_t - \sum_{\tau=t}^{t+T_t-1} p_\tau \right) \max_{\hat{a}_i} u_i(\hat{a}_i, \alpha_j^{\varepsilon_t}) + \left(\varepsilon_t + \sum_{\tau=t}^{t+T_t-1} p_\tau \right) \max_{a \in A} u_i(a) \right\} \\
&\quad + \delta^{T_t} \max_{a \in A} u_i(a).
\end{aligned}$$

Moreover, $\mathbb{E}^{\mu^*}$ does not depend on the specification of player j 's strategy after player j 's own deviation, for each history h_i^t such that player i has not deviated.

PROOF. Given $\hat{\mu}$, since $u(\hat{\mu}) \in \hat{W}^*$, for sufficiently small $\varepsilon_t > 0$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
&(1 - \delta) \mathbb{E}^{\hat{\mu}}[u_i(r_t) \mid h_m^t, r_{i,t}] + \delta u_i(\hat{\mu}) \\
&> \max_{a_i \in A_i} (1 - \delta) \mathbb{E}[u_i(a_i, r_{-i,t}) \mid h_m^t, r_{i,t}] \\
&\quad + (\delta - \delta^{T_t}) \left\{ (1 - \varepsilon_t) \max_{\hat{a}_i} u_i(\hat{a}_i, \alpha_j^{\varepsilon_t}) + \varepsilon_t \max_{a \in A} u_i(a) \right\} + \delta^{T_t} \max_{a \in A} u_i(a)
\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
&(1 - \delta) \mathbb{E}^{\hat{\mu}}[u_i(r_t) \mid h_m^t, r_{i,t}] + \delta u_i(\hat{\mu}) \\
&> (1 - \delta^{T_t}) \left\{ (1 - \varepsilon_t) \max_{\hat{a}_i} u_i(\hat{a}_i, \alpha_j^{\varepsilon_t}) + \varepsilon_t \max_{a \in A} u_i(a) \right\} + \delta^{T_t} \max_{a \in A} u_i(a).
\end{aligned}$$

Hence (S1) and (S2) hold with μ replaced with $\hat{\mu}$.

Since μ^* has full support on the equilibrium path, a player i who has not yet deviated always believes that player j has not deviated. Hence, $\mathbb{E}^{\mu^*}$ is well defined without specifying player j 's strategy after player j 's own deviation.

Moreover, since p_t is small and $\omega_{j,t}$ is independent of $(\omega_\tau)_{\tau=1}^{t-1}$ and $\omega_{i,t}$, given $(\bar{\omega}_\tau(a^\tau))_{\tau=1}^{t-1}$ and $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t)$ (which are equal to $(\omega_\tau)_{\tau=1}^{t-1}$ and $\omega_{i,t}$ on path), player i believes that $\bar{\omega}_{j,t}(a^t)$ is equal to $\omega_{j,t}$ and $\omega_{j,t}$ is equal to R with a high probability, unless player i has deviated. Since

$$\Pr^{\mu^*}(r_{j,t} \mid \bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t), \{\bar{\omega}_{j,t}(a^t) = R\}, h_i^t) = \Pr^{\mu^*}(r_{j,t} \mid a^t, r_{i,t}),$$

we have that the difference

$$\mathbb{E}^{\mu^*}[u_i(r_{i,t}, a_{j,t}) \mid h_i^t] - \mathbb{E}^\mu[u_i(r_{i,t}, a_{j,t}) \mid r_i^t, a^t, r_{i,t}]$$

is small for small p_t .

Further, if p_τ is small for each $\tau \geq t+1$, then since ω_τ is independent of ω_t with $t \leq \tau-1$, regardless of $(\bar{\omega}_\tau(a^\tau))_{\tau=1}^t$, player i believes that $\bar{\omega}_{i,\tau}(a^\tau) = \bar{\omega}_{j,\tau}(a^\tau) = R$ with high probability for $\tau \geq t+1$ on the equilibrium path. Since the distribution of the recommendation given μ^* is the same as that of μ (or $\hat{\mu}$) given a^τ and $(\bar{\omega}_{i,\tau}(a^\tau), \bar{\omega}_{j,\tau}(a^\tau)) = (R, R)$ for each $\tau \leq t-1$ (or $(\bar{\omega}_{i,\tau}(a^\tau), \bar{\omega}_{j,\tau}(a^\tau)) \neq (R, R)$ for some $\tau \leq t-1$, respectively), we have that

1. for each h_i^t with $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$ and $(\bar{\omega}_{i,\tau}(a^\tau), \bar{\omega}_{j,\tau}(a^\tau)) = (R, R)$ for each $\tau \leq t-1$,

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}^{\mu^*} \left[(1-\delta) \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \delta^{\tau-t-1} u_i(r_{i,\tau}, a_{j,\tau}) \mid h_i^t, a_{i,t} = r_{i,t} \right] \\ & - \mathbb{E}^{\mu} \left[(1-\delta) \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \delta^{\tau-t-1} u_i(r_{i,\tau}, a_{j,\tau}) \mid r_i^t, a^t, r_{i,t} \right] \end{aligned}$$

is small for small p_τ with $\tau \geq t+1$; and

2. for each h_i^t with $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$ and $(\bar{\omega}_{i,\tau}(a^\tau), \bar{\omega}_{j,\tau}(a^\tau)) \neq (R, R)$ for some $\tau \leq t-1$,

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}^{\mu^*} \left[(1-\delta) \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \delta^{\tau-t-1} u_i(r_{i,\tau}, a_{j,\tau}) \mid h_i^t, a_{i,t} = r_{i,t} \right] \\ & - \mathbb{E}^{\mu} \left[(1-\delta) \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \delta^{\tau-t-1} u_i(r_{i,\tau}, a_{j,\tau}) \mid r_i^t, a^t, r_{i,t} \right] \end{aligned}$$

is small for small p_τ with $\tau \geq t+1$.

Hence, (S1) and (S2) (and the same inequalities with μ^* replaced with $\hat{\mu}$) imply that, there exists $\bar{p}_t > 0$ such that, if $p_\tau \leq \bar{p}_t$ for each $\tau \geq t$, then the claims of the lemma hold. Hence, if we take $p_t \leq \min_{\tau \leq t} \bar{p}_\tau$, then the claims hold. $\square$

We fix $\{p_t\}_{t=1}^\infty$ so that Lemma S1 holds. This fully pins down μ^* with mediated perfect monitoring.

Construction with perfect monitoring with cheap talk

Given μ^* with mediated perfect monitoring, we define the equilibrium strategy with perfect monitoring with cheap talk such that the equilibrium action distribution is the same as μ^* . We must pin down the following four objects: at the beginning of the game, what message m_i^{mediator} player i receives from the mediator; what message $m_{i,t}^{\text{1st}}$ player i sends at the beginning of period t ; what action $a_{i,t}$ player i takes in period t ; and what message $m_{i,t}^{\text{2nd}}$ player i sends at the end of period t .

Intuitive argument As in μ^* , at the beginning of the game, for each i , t , and a^t , the mediator draws $r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t)$ according to $\alpha_i^{e_t}$. In addition, with $p_t > 0$ pinned down in Lemma S1, she draws $\omega_t \in \{R, P\}^2$ and $r_t(a^t)$ as in μ^* for each t and a^t . She then defines $\bar{\omega}_t(a^t)$ from a^t , $r_t(a^t)$, and ω_t as in μ^* .

Intuitively, the mediator sends all the information about

$$((\bar{\omega}_t(a^t), r_t(a^t), r_{1,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t), r_{2,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t))_{a^t \in A^{t-1}})_{t=1}^\infty$$

through the initial messages $(m_1^{\text{mediator}}, m_2^{\text{mediator}})$. In particular, the mediator directly sends $((r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t))_{a^t \in A^{t-1}})_{t=1}^\infty$ to player i as a part of m_i^{mediator} . Hence, we focus on how

we replicate the role of the mediator in μ^* of sending $(\bar{\omega}_t(a^t), r_t(a^t))$ in each period, depending on realized history a^t .

The key features to establish are (i) player i does not know the instructions for the other player, (ii) before player i reaches period t , player i does not know her own recommendations for periods $\tau \geq t$ (otherwise, player i would obtain more information than the original equilibrium μ^* and thus might want to deviate), and (iii) no player wants to deviate (in particular, if player i deviates in actions or cheap talk, then the strategy of player j is as if the state were $\bar{\omega}_{j,t} = P$ in μ^* , for a sufficiently long time with a sufficiently high probability).

The properties (i) and (ii) are achieved by the same mechanism as in Theorem 9 of [Heller et al. \(2012, henceforth HST\)](#). In particular, without loss, let $A_i = \{1_i, \dots, n_i\}$ be player i 's action set. We can view $r_{i,t}(a^t)$ as an element of $\{1, \dots, n_i\}$. The mediator at the beginning of the game draws $r_t(a^t)$ for each a^t .

Instead of sending $r_{i,t}(a^t)$ directly to player i , the mediator encodes $r_{i,t}(a^t)$ as follows: For a sufficiently large $N^t \in \mathbb{Z}$ to be determined, we define $p^t = N^t n_i n_j$. This p^t corresponds to p_h in HST. Let $\mathbb{Z}_{p^t} \equiv \{1, \dots, p^t\}$. The mediator draws $x_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ uniformly and independently from $\mathbb{Z}_{p^t}$ for each i, t , and a^t . Given them, she defines

$$y_{i,t}^i(a^t) \equiv x_{i,t}^j(a^t) + r_{i,t}(a^t) \pmod{n_i}. \quad (\text{S5})$$

Intuitively, $y_{i,t}^i(a^t)$ is the “encoded instruction” of $r_{i,t}(a^t)$, and to obtain $r_{i,t}(a^t)$ from $y_{i,t}^i(a^t)$, player i needs to know $x_{i,t}^j(a^t)$. The mediator gives $((y_i^i(a^t))_{a^t \in A^{t-1}})_{t=1}^\infty$ to player i as a part of m_i^{mediator} . At the same time, she gives $((x_{i,t}^j(a^t))_{a^t \in A^{t-1}})_{t=1}^\infty$ to player j as a part of m_j^{mediator} . At the beginning of period t , player j sends $x_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ by cheap talk as a part of $m_{j,t}^{\text{1st}}$, based on the realized action a^t , so that player i does not know $r_{i,t}(a^t)$ until period t . (Throughout the proof, the superscript of a variable represents who is informed about the variable, and the subscript represents whose recommendation the variable is about.)

To incentivize player j to tell the truth, the equilibrium should embed a mechanism that punishes player i if she tells a lie. In HST, this is done as follows: The mediator draws $\alpha_{i,t}^i(a^t)$ and $\beta_{i,t}^i(a^t)$ uniformly and independently from $\mathbb{Z}_{p^t}$, and defines

$$u_{i,t}^j(a^t) \equiv \alpha_{i,t}^i(a^t) \times x_{i,t}^j(a^t) + \beta_{i,t}^i(a^t) \pmod{p^t}. \quad (\text{S6})$$

The mediator gives $x_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ and $u_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ to player j while she gives $\alpha_{i,t}^i(a^t)$ and $\beta_{i,t}^i(a^t)$ to player i . In period t , player j is supposed to send $x_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ and $u_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ to player i . If player i receives $x_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ and $u_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ with

$$u_{i,t}^j(a^t) \neq \alpha_{i,t}^i(a^t) \times x_{i,t}^j(a^t) + \beta_{i,t}^i(a^t) \pmod{p^t}, \quad (\text{S7})$$

then player i interprets that player j has deviated. For sufficiently large N^t , since player j does not know $\alpha_{i,t}^i(a^t)$ and $\beta_{i,t}^i(a^t)$, if player j tells a lie about $x_{i,t}^j(a^t)$, then with a high probability, player j creates a situation where (S7) holds.

Since HST considers Nash equilibrium, they let player i minimax player j forever after (S7) holds. However, since we consider sequential equilibrium, as in the proof of Lemma 2, we will create a coordination mechanism such that, if player j tells a lie, then with high probability player i minimaxes player j for a long time and player i assigns probability 0 to the event that player i punishes player j .

To this end, we consider the following coordination: First, if and only if $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$, the mediator defines $u_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ as (S6). Otherwise, $u_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ is randomly drawn. That is,

$$u_{i,t}^j(a^t) \equiv \begin{cases} \alpha_{i,t}^i(a^t) \times x_{i,t}^j(a^t) + \beta_{i,t}^i(a^t) \pmod{p^t} & \text{if } \bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R, \\ \text{uniformly distributed over } \mathbb{Z}_{p^t} & \text{if } \bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P. \end{cases} \quad (\text{S8})$$

Since both $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$ and $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P$ happen with a positive probability, player i after receiving $u_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ with $u_{i,t}^j(a^t) \neq \alpha_{i,t}^i(a^t) \times x_{i,t}^j(a^t) + \beta_{i,t}^i(a^t) \pmod{p^t}$ interprets that $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P$. For notational convenience, let $\hat{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) \in \{R, P\}$ be player i 's interpretation of $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t)$. After $\hat{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P$, she takes period- t action according to $r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t)$. Given this inference, if player j tells a lie about $u_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ with $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$, then with a high probability, she induces a situation with $u_{i,t}^j(a^t) \neq \alpha_{i,t}^i(a^t) \times x_{i,t}^j(a^t) + \beta_{i,t}^i(a^t) \pmod{p^t}$, and player i punishes player j in period t (without noticing player j 's deviation).

Second, switching to $r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t)$ for period t only may not suffice if player j believes that player i 's action distribution given $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$ is close to the minimax strategy. Hence, we ensure that once player j deviates, player i takes $r_{i,\tau}^{\text{punish}}(a^\tau)$ for a sufficiently long time.

To this end, we change the mechanism so that player j does not always know $u_{i,t}^j(a^t)$. Instead, the mediator draws p^t independent random variables $v_{i,t}^j(n, a^t)$ with $n = 1, \dots, p^t$ uniformly from $\mathbb{Z}_{p^t}$. In addition, she draws $n_{i,t}^i(a^t)$ uniformly from $\mathbb{Z}_{p^t}$. The mediator defines $u_{i,t}^j(n, a^t)$ for each $n = 1, \dots, p^t$ as

$$u_{i,t}^j(n, a^t) = \begin{cases} u_{i,t}^j(a^t) & \text{if } n = n_{i,t}^i(a^t), \\ v_{i,t}^j(n, a^t) & \text{if otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

that is, $u_{i,t}^j(n, a^t)$ corresponds to $u_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ with (S8) only if $n = n_{i,t}^i(a^t)$. For other n , $u_{i,t}^j(n, a^t)$ is completely random.

The mediator sends $n_{i,t}^i(a^t)$ to player i , and sends $\{u_{i,t}^j(n, a^t)\}_{n \in \mathbb{Z}_{p^t}}$ to player j . In addition, the mediator sends $n_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ to player j , where

$$n_{i,t}^j(a^t) = \begin{cases} n_{i,t}^i(a^t) & \text{if } \omega_{i,t-1}(a^{t-1}) = P, \\ \text{uniformly distributed over } \mathbb{Z}_{p^t} & \text{if } \omega_{i,t-1}(a^{t-1}) = R \end{cases}$$

is equal to $n_{i,t}^i(a^t)$ if and only if last-period $\bar{\omega}_{i,t-1}(a^{t-1})$ is equal to P .

In period t , player j is asked to send $x_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ and $u_{i,t}^j(n, a^t)$ with $n = n_{i,t}^i(a^t)$, that is, send $x_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ and $u_{i,t}^j(a^t)$. If and only if player j 's messages $\hat{x}_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ and $\hat{u}_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ satisfy

$$\hat{u}_{i,t}^j(a^t) = \alpha_{i,t}^i(a^t) \times \hat{x}_{i,t}^j(a^t) + \beta_{i,t}^i(a^t) \pmod{p^t},$$

player i interprets $\hat{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$. If player i has $\hat{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$, then player i knows that player j needs to know $n_{i,t+1}^i(a^{t+1})$ to send the correct $u_{i,t+1}^j(n, a^{t+1})$ in the next period. Hence, she sends $n_{i,t+1}^i(a^{t+1})$ to player j . If player i has $\hat{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P$, then she believes that player j knows $n_{i,t+1}^i(a^{t+1})$ and does not send $n_{i,t+1}^i(a^{t+1})$.

Given this coordination, once player j creates a situation with $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$ but $\hat{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P$, then player j cannot receive $n_{i,t+1}^i(a^{t+1})$. Without knowing $n_{i,t+1}^i(a^{t+1})$, with a large N^{t+1} , with a high probability, player j cannot know which $u_{i,t+1}^j(n, a^{t+1})$ she should send. Then, again, she will create a situation with

$$\hat{u}_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1}) \neq \alpha_{i,t+1}^i(a^{t+1}) \times \hat{x}_{i,t}^j(a^{t+1}) + \beta_{i,t}^i(a^{t+1}) \pmod{p^{t+1}},$$

that is, $\hat{\omega}_{i,t+1}(a^{t+1}) = P$. Recursively, player i has $\hat{\omega}_{i,\tau}(a^\tau) = P$ for a long time with a high probability if player j tells a lie.

Finally, if player j takes a deviant action in period t , then the mediator has drawn $\bar{\omega}_{i,\tau}(a^\tau) = P$ for each $\tau \geq t + 1$ for a^τ corresponding to the realized history. With $\bar{\omega}_{i,\tau}(a^\tau) = P$, so as to avoid $\hat{\omega}_{i,\tau}(a^\tau) = P$, player j needs to create a situation

$$\hat{u}_{i,\tau}^j(a^\tau) = \alpha_{i,\tau}^i(a^\tau) \times \hat{x}_{i,\tau}^j(a^\tau) + \beta_{i,\tau}^i(a^\tau) \pmod{p^\tau}$$

without knowing $\alpha_{i,\tau}^i(a^\tau)$ and $\beta_{i,\tau}^i(a^\tau)$ while the mediator's message does not tell her what is $\alpha_{i,t}^i(a^t) \times x_{i,t}^j(a^t) + \beta_{i,t}^i(a^t) \pmod{p^t}$ by (S8). Hence, for sufficiently large N^t , player j cannot avoid $\hat{\omega}_{i,\tau}(a^\tau) = P$ with a nonnegligible probability. Hence, player j will be minmaxed from the next period with a high probability.

The above argument in total shows that if player j deviates, whether in communication or action, then she will be minmaxed for a sufficiently long time. Lemma S1 ensures that player j does not want to tell a lie or take a deviant action.

Formal construction Let us formalize the above construction: As in μ^* , at the beginning of the game, for each i , t , and a^t , the mediator draws $r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t)$ according to $\alpha_{i,t}^{\varepsilon_i}$; then she draws $\omega_t \in \{R, P\}^2$ and $r_t(a^t)$ for each t and a^t ; and then she defines $\bar{\omega}_t(a^t)$ from a^t , $r_t(a^t)$, and ω_t as in μ^* . For each t and a^t , she draws $x_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ uniformly and independently from $\mathbb{Z}_{p^t}$. Given them, she defines

$$y_{i,t}^j(a^t) \equiv x_{i,t}^j(a^t) + r_{i,t}(a^t) \pmod{n_i},$$

so that (S5) holds.

The mediator draws $\alpha_{i,t}^i(a^t)$, $\beta_{i,t}^i(a^t)$, $\tilde{u}_{i,t}^j(a^t)$, $v_{i,t}^j(n, a^t)$ for each $n \in \mathbb{Z}_{p^t}$, $n_{i,t}^i(a^t)$, and $\tilde{n}_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ from the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_{p^t}$ independently for each player i , each period t , and each a^t .

As in (S8), the mediator defines

$$u_{i,t}^j(a^t) \equiv \begin{cases} \alpha_{i,t}^j(a^t) \times x_{i,t}^j(a^t) + \beta_{i,t}^j(a^t) \pmod{p^t} & \text{if } \bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R, \\ \tilde{u}_{i,t}^j(a^t) & \text{if } \bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P. \end{cases}$$

In addition, the mediator defines

$$u_{i,t}^j(n, a^t) = \begin{cases} u_{i,t}^j(a^t) & \text{if } n = n_{i,t}^i(a^t), \\ v_{i,t}^j(n, a^t) & \text{if otherwise} \end{cases}$$

and

$$n_{i,t}^j(a^t) = \begin{cases} n_{i,t}^i(a^t) & \text{if } t = 1 \text{ or } \omega_{i,t-1}(a^{t-1}) = P, \\ \tilde{n}_{i,t}^j(a^t) & \text{if } t \neq 1 \text{ and } \omega_{i,t-1}(a^{t-1}) = R, \end{cases}$$

as explained above.

Let us now define the equilibrium:

- (i) At the beginning of the game, the mediator sends

$$m_i^{\text{mediator}} = \left(\left(y_{i,t}^i(a^t), \alpha_{i,t}^i(a^t), \beta_{i,t}^i(a^t), r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t), \right. \right. \\ \left. \left. n_{i,t}^i(a^t), n_{j,t}^i(a^t), (u_{j,t}^i(n, a^t))_{n \in \mathbb{Z}_{p^t}}, x_{j,t}^i(a^t) \right)_{a^t \in A^{t-1}} \right)_{t=1}^{\infty}$$

to each player i .

- (ii) In each period t , the stage game proceeds as follows: In equilibrium,

$$m_{j,t}^{1\text{st}} = \begin{cases} u_{i,t}^j(m_{i,t-1}^{2\text{nd}}, a^t), x_{i,t}^j(a^t) & \text{if } t \neq 1 \text{ and } m_{i,t-1}^{2\text{nd}} \neq \{\text{babble}\}, \\ u_{i,t}^j(n_{i,t}^j(a^t), a^t), x_{i,t}^j(a^t) & \text{if } t = 1 \text{ or } m_{i,t-1}^{2\text{nd}} = \{\text{babble}\} \end{cases} \quad (\text{S9})$$

and

$$m_{j,t}^{2\text{nd}} = \begin{cases} n_{j,t+1}^j(a^{t+1}) & \text{if } \hat{\omega}_{j,t}(a^t) = R, \\ \{\text{babble}\} & \text{if } \hat{\omega}_{j,t}(a^t) = P. \end{cases}$$

Note that, since $m_{j,t}^{2\text{nd}}$ is sent at the end of period t , the players know $a^{t+1} = (a_1, \dots, a_t)$.

- (a) Given player i 's history $(m_i^{\text{mediator}}, (m_{\tau}^{1\text{st}}, a_{\tau}, m_{\tau}^{2\text{nd}})_{\tau=1}^{t-1})$, each player i sends the first message $m_{i,t}^{1\text{st}}$ simultaneously. If player i herself has not yet deviated, then

$$m_{i,t}^{1\text{st}} = \begin{cases} u_{j,t}^i(m_{j,t-1}^{2\text{nd}}, a^t), x_{j,t}^i(a^t) & \text{if } t \neq 1 \text{ and } m_{j,t-1}^{2\text{nd}} \neq \{\text{babble}\}, \\ u_{j,t}^i(n_{j,t}^i(a^t), a^t), x_{j,t}^i(a^t) & \text{if } t = 1 \text{ or } m_{j,t-1}^{2\text{nd}} = \{\text{babble}\}. \end{cases}$$

Let $m_{i,t}^{1\text{st}}(u)$ be the first element of $m_{i,t}^{1\text{st}}$ (that is, either $u_{j,t}^i(m_{j,t-1}^{2\text{nd}}, a^t)$ or $u_{j,t}^i(n_{j,t}^i(a^t), a^t)$ on equilibrium), and let $m_{i,t}^{1\text{st}}(x)$ be the second element ($x_{j,t}^i(a^t)$ on equilibrium). As a result, the profile of the messages $m_t^{1\text{st}}$ becomes common knowledge.

If

$$m_{j,t}^{1st}(u) \neq \alpha_{i,t}^i(a^t) \times m_{j,t}^{1st}(x) + \beta_{i,t}^i(a^t) \pmod{p^t}, \quad (S10)$$

then player i interprets $\hat{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P$. Otherwise, $\hat{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$.

- (b) Given player i 's history $(m_i^{\text{mediator}}, (m_\tau^{1st}, a_\tau, m_\tau^{2nd})_{\tau=1}^{t-1}, m_t^{1st})$, each player i takes action $a_{i,t}$ simultaneously. If player i herself has not yet deviated, then player i takes $a_{i,t} = r_{i,t}$ with

$$r_{i,t} = \begin{cases} y_{i,t}^i(a^t) - m_{j,t}^{1st}(x) \pmod{n_i} & \text{if } \hat{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R, \\ r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t) & \text{if } \hat{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P. \end{cases} \quad (S11)$$

Recall that $y_{i,t}^i(a^t) \equiv x_{i,t}^j(a^t) + r_{i,t}(a^t) \pmod{n_i}$ by (S5). By (S9), therefore, player i takes $r_{i,t}^i(a^t)$ if $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$ and $r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t)$ if $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P$ on the equilibrium path, as in μ^* .

- (c) Given player i 's history $(m_i^{\text{mediator}}, (m_\tau^{1st}, a_\tau, m_\tau^{2nd})_{\tau=1}^{t-1}, m_t^{1st}, a_t)$, each player i sends the second message $m_{i,t}^{2nd}$ simultaneously. If player i herself has not yet deviated, then

$$m_{i,t}^{2nd} = \begin{cases} n_{i,t+1}^i(a^{t+1}) & \text{if } \hat{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R, \\ \{\text{babble}\} & \text{if } \hat{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P. \end{cases}$$

As a result, the profile of the messages m_t^{2nd} becomes common knowledge. Note that $\bar{\omega}_t(a^t)$ becomes common knowledge as well on equilibrium path.

Incentive compatibility

The above equilibrium has full support: Since $\bar{\omega}_t(a^t)$ and $r_t(a^t)$ have full support, $(m_1^{\text{mediator}}, m_2^{\text{mediator}})$ have full support as well. Hence, we are left to verify player i 's incentive not to deviate from the equilibrium strategy, given that player i believes that player j has not yet deviated after any history of player i .

Suppose that player i followed the equilibrium strategy until the end of period $t-1$. First, consider player i 's incentive to tell the truth about $m_{i,t}^{1st}$. In equilibrium, player i sends

$$m_{i,t}^{1st} = \begin{cases} u_{j,t}^i(m_{j,t-1}^{2nd}, a^t), x_{j,t}^i(a^t) & \text{if } m_{j,t-1}^{2nd} \neq \{\text{babble}\}, \\ u_{j,t}^i(n_{j,t}^i(a^t), a^t), x_{j,t}^i(a^t) & \text{if } m_{j,t-1}^{2nd} = \{\text{babble}\}. \end{cases}$$

The random variables possessed by player i are independent of those possessed by player j given $(m_\tau^{1st}, a_\tau, m_\tau^{2nd})_{\tau=1}^{t-1}$, except that (i) $u_{i,t}^j(a^t) = \alpha_{i,t}^j(a^t) \times x_{i,t}^j(a^t) + \beta_{i,t}^j(a^t) \pmod{p^t}$ if $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$, (ii) $u_{j,t}^i(a^t) = \alpha_{j,t}^i(a^t) \times x_{j,t}^i(a^t) + \beta_{j,t}^i(a^t) \pmod{p^t}$ if $\bar{\omega}_{j,t}(a^t) = R$, (iii) $n_{i,\tau}^j(a^\tau) = n_{i,\tau}^i(a^\tau)$ if $\omega_{i,\tau-1}(a^{\tau-1}) = P$ while $n_{i,\tau}^j(a^\tau) = \tilde{n}_{i,\tau}^i(a^\tau)$ if $\omega_{i,\tau-1}(a^{\tau-1}) = R$, and (iv) $n_{j,\tau}^i(a^\tau) = n_{j,\tau}^j(a^\tau)$ if $\omega_{j,\tau-1}(a^{\tau-1}) = P$ while $n_{j,\tau}^i(a^\tau) = \tilde{n}_{j,\tau}^j(a^\tau)$ if $\omega_{j,\tau-1}(a^{\tau-1}) = R$.

Since $\alpha_{i,t}^i(a^t)$, $\beta_{i,t}^i(a^t)$, $\tilde{u}_{i,t}^j(a^t)$, $v_{i,t}^j(n, a^t)$, $n_{i,t}^i(a^t)$, and $\tilde{n}_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ are uniform and independent, player i cannot learn $\bar{\omega}_{i,\tau}(a^\tau)$, $r_{i,\tau}(a^\tau)$, or $r_{j,\tau}(a^\tau)$ with $\tau \geq t$. Hence, player i believes at the time when she sends $m_{i,t}^{1st}$ that her equilibrium value is equal to

$$(1 - \delta)\mathbb{E}^{\mu^*}[u_i(a_t) \mid h_i^t] + \delta\mathbb{E}^{\mu^*}\left[(1 - \delta) \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \delta^{\tau-t-1} u_i(a_t) \mid h_i^t\right],$$

where h_i^t is as if player i observed $(r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t))_{a^t \in A^{t-1} t=1}^{\infty}$, a^t , $(\bar{\omega}_\tau(a^\tau))_{\tau=1}^{t-1}$, and $r_{i,t}(a^t)$, and believed that $r_\tau(a^\tau) = a_\tau$ for each $\tau = 1, \dots, t-1$ with μ^* with mediated perfect monitoring.

Alternatively, for each $e > 0$, for a sufficiently large N^t , if player i tells a lie in at least one element $m_{i,t}^{1st}$, then with probability $1 - e$, player i creates a situation

$$m_{i,t}^{1st}(u) \neq \alpha_{j,t}^j(a^t) \times m_{i,t}^{1st}(x) + \beta_{j,t}^j(a^t) \pmod{p^t}.$$

Hence, (S10) (with indices i and j reversed) implies that $\hat{\omega}_{j,t}(a^t) = P$.

Moreover, if player i creates a situation with $\hat{\omega}_{j,t}(a^t) = P$, then player j will send $m_{j,t}^{2nd} = \{\text{babble}\}$ instead of $n_{j,t+1}^j(a^{t+1})$. Unless $\bar{\omega}_{j,t}(a^t) = P$, since $n_{j,t+1}^j(a^{t+1})$ is independent of player i 's variables, player i believes that $n_{j,t+1}^j(a^{t+1})$ is distributed uniformly over $\mathbb{Z}_{p^{t+1}}$. Hence, for each $e > 0$, for sufficiently large N^t , if $\hat{\omega}_{j,t}(a^t) = R$, then player i will send $m_{i,t+1}^{1st}$ with

$$m_{i,t+1}^{1st}(u) \neq \alpha_{j,t+1}^j(a^{t+1}) \times m_{i,t+1}^{1st}(x) + \beta_{j,t+1}^j(a^{t+1}) \pmod{p^{t+1}}$$

with probability $1 - e$. Then, by (S10) (with indices i and j reversed), player j will have $\hat{\omega}_{j,t+1}(a^{t+1}) = P$.

Recursively, if $\bar{\omega}_{j,\tau}(a^\tau) = R$ for each $\tau = t, \dots, t + T_t - 1$, then player i will induce $\hat{\omega}_{j,\tau}(a^\tau) = P$ for each $\tau = t, \dots, t + T_t - 1$ with a high probability. Hence, for $\varepsilon_t > 0$ and T_t fixed in (S1) and (S2), for sufficiently large $\bar{N}^t$, if $N^\tau \geq \bar{N}^t$ for each $\tau \geq t$, then player i will be punished for the subsequent T_t periods regardless of player i 's continuation strategy with probability no less than $1 - \varepsilon_t - \sum_{\tau=t}^{t+T_t-1} p_\tau$. ($\sum_{\tau=t}^{t+T_t-1} p_\tau$ represents the maximum probability of having $\bar{\omega}_{i,\tau}(a^\tau) = P$ for some τ for subsequent T_t periods.) Equation (S4) implies that telling a lie gives a strictly lower payoff than the equilibrium payoff. Therefore, it is optimal to tell the truth about $m_{i,t}^{1st}$. (In (S4), we have shown interim incentive compatibility after knowing $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t)$ and $r_{i,t}$, while here we consider h_i^t before $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t)$ and $r_{i,t}$. Taking the expectation with respect to $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t)$ and $r_{i,t}$, (S4) ensures incentive compatibility before knowing $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t)$ and $r_{i,t}$.)

Second, consider player i 's incentive to take the action $a_{i,t} = r_{i,t}$ according to (S11) if player i follows the equilibrium strategy until she sends $m_{i,t}^{1st}$. If she follows the equilibrium strategy, then player i believes at the time when she takes an action that her equilibrium value is equal to

$$(1 - \delta)\mathbb{E}^{\mu^*}[u_i(a_t) \mid h_i^t] + \delta\mathbb{E}^{\mu^*}\left[(1 - \delta) \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \delta^{\tau-t-1} u_i(a_t) \mid h_i^t\right],$$

where h_i^t is as if player i observed $(r_{i,t}^{\text{punish}}(a^t))^{\infty}_{a^t \in A^{t-1}t=1}$, a^t , $(\bar{\omega}_\tau(a^\tau))^{\tau=1}^{t-1}$, $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t)$, and $r_{i,t}$, and believed that $r_\tau(a^\tau) = a_\tau$ for each $\tau = 1, \dots, t-1$ with μ^* with mediated perfect monitoring. (Compared to the time when player i sends $m_{i,t}^{1\text{st}}$, player i now knows $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t)$ and $r_{i,t}$ on the equilibrium path.)

If player i deviates from $a_{i,t}$, then $\bar{\omega}_{j,\tau}(a^\tau) = P$ by definition for each $\tau \geq t+1$ and a^τ that is compatible with a^t (that is, $a^\tau = (a^t, a_t, \dots, a_{\tau-1})$ for some $a_t, \dots, a_{\tau-1}$). To avoid being minmaxed in period τ , player i needs to induce $\hat{\omega}_{j,\tau}(a^\tau) = R$ although $\bar{\omega}_{j,\tau}(a^\tau) = P$. Given $\bar{\omega}_{j,\tau}(a^\tau) = P$, since $\alpha_{i,t}^j(a^t)$, $\beta_{i,t}^j(a^t)$, $\tilde{u}_{i,t}^j(a^t)$, $v_{i,t}^j(n, a^t)$, $n_{i,t}^j(a^t)$, and $\tilde{n}_{i,t}^j(a^t)$ are uniform and independent (conditional on the other variables), regardless of player i 's continuation strategy, by (S10) (with indices i and j reversed), player i will send $m_{i,\tau}^{1\text{st}}$ with

$$m_{i,\tau}^{1\text{st}}(u) \neq \alpha_{j,\tau}^j(a^\tau) \times m_{i,\tau}^{1\text{st}}(x) + \beta_{j,\tau}^j(a^\tau) \pmod{p^\tau}$$

with a high probability.

Hence, for sufficiently large $\bar{N}^t$, if $N^\tau \geq \bar{N}^t$ for each $\tau \geq t$, then player i will be punished for the next T_i periods regardless of player i 's continuation strategy with probability no less than $1 - \varepsilon_t$. By (S3), deviating from $r_{i,t}$ gives a strictly lower payoff than her equilibrium payoff. Therefore, it is optimal to take $a_{i,t} = r_{i,t}$.

Finally, consider player i 's incentive to tell the truth about $m_{i,t}^{2\text{nd}}$. Regardless of $m_{i,t}^{2\text{nd}}$, player j 's actions do not change. Hence, we are left to show that telling a lie does not improve player i 's deviation gain by giving player i more information.

On the equilibrium path, player i knows $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t)$. If player i tells the truth, then $m_{i,t}^{2\text{nd}} = n_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1}) \neq \{\text{babble}\}$ if and only if $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R$. Moreover, player j sends

$$m_{j,t+1}^{1\text{st}} = \begin{cases} u_{i,t+1}^j(m_{i,t}^{2\text{nd}}, a^{t+1}), x_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1}) & \text{if } \bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = R, \\ u_{i,t+1}^j(n_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1}), a^{t+1}), x_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1}) & \text{if } \bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P. \end{cases}$$

Since $n_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1}) = n_{i,t+1}^i(a^{t+1})$ if $\bar{\omega}_{i,t}(a^t) = P$, in total, if player i tells the truth, then player i knows $u_{j,t+1}^i(m_{i,t+1}^i(a^{t+1}), a^{t+1})$ and $x_{j,t+1}^i(a^{t+1})$. This is sufficient information to infer $\bar{\omega}_{i,t+1}(a^{t+1})$ and $r_{i,t+1}(a^{t+1})$ correctly.

If she tells a lie, then player j 's messages are changed to

$$m_{j,t+1}^{1\text{st}} = \begin{cases} u_{i,t+1}^j(m_{i,t}^{2\text{nd}}, a^{t+1}), x_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1}) & \text{if } m_{i,t}^{2\text{nd}} \neq \{\text{babble}\}, \\ u_{i,t+1}^j(n_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1}), a^{t+1}), x_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1}) & \text{if } m_{i,t}^{2\text{nd}} = \{\text{babble}\}. \end{cases}$$

Since $\alpha_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1})$, $\beta_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1})$, $\tilde{u}_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1})$, $v_{i,t+1}^j(n, a^{t+1})$, $n_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1})$, and $\tilde{n}_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1})$ are uniform and independent conditional on $\bar{\omega}_{i,t+1}(a^{t+1})$ and $r_{i,t+1}(a^{t+1})$, $u_{i,t+1}^j(n, a^{t+1})$ and $x_{i,t+1}^j(a^{t+1})$ are not informative about player j 's recommendation from period $t+1$ on or player i 's recommendation from period $t+2$ on, given that player i knows $\bar{\omega}_{i,t+1}(a^{t+1})$ and $r_{i,t+1}(a^{t+1})$. Since telling the truth informs player i of $\bar{\omega}_{i,t+1}(a^{t+1})$ and $r_{i,t+1}(a^{t+1})$, there is no gain from telling a lie.

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